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ABSTRACT 
 In 2019, the Commandant of the Marine Corps stated in his planning guidance 
that “we should use money like a focused weapon, and aim it at the exact individual we 
need.” In response to this call for targeted talent management reform, I use FITREP duty 
station preference and performance data to conduct fixed effects difference-in-differences 
and survival analysis to examine how assignment to a desired duty station affects the 
future performance and retention of Marines. Results indicate that enlisted Marines who 
are assigned to desired duty stations early in their careers on average perform .232 points 
higher on their FITREPs relative to Marines who are not. Top-tier performers who 
receive desired orders perform .336 better than their counterparts, and Marines who 
request and are assigned to the operating forces outperformed peers by 0.537. 
Assignment to desired duty stations is also highly correlated with the retention of top-
performing officers. These are the Marines we need and want fighting our nation’s wars, 
both on the ground and at the strategic level, and results indicate that preferential duty 
station assignment has a particularly positive impact on them. In his guidance, the 
Commandant also states that “an incentives-based model would offer the ability to target 
incentives to specific individuals the Service wants to retain.” The results of this research 
indicate that preferential duty station assignment has the potential to do just that. 
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You can get everything else wrong, but if you get the people right, you will be alright.  
                        — Brigadier General William Bowers, USMC (Augier & Hughes, 2018) 
 
It’s like, when it comes to personnel, we never get who’s right; we only get who’s left. 
— Overheard anonymous captain of Marines, USMC (2020) 
 
 
In July 2019, the 38th Commandant of the Marine Corps, General David H. Berger, 
released his Commandant’s Planning Guidance (CPG), which serves as the authoritative 
strategic document for the Marine Corps Total Force. In this document, General Berger 
argues that “the only way to attract and retain Marines capable of winning on the new 
battlefield is to compete with the tools and incentives available to them in the marketplace” 
(Unites States Marine Corps [USMC], 2019a, p. 7). Talent and personnel management are 
perennial and well-researched areas of study in both private and public industries due to 
the high cost of recruiting, training, and hiring replacement personnel and the importance 
of employee performance to the success of an organization. Despite numerous calls for 
talent and personnel management reform within the Marine Corps, however, little research 
has examined the effects of duty preferences and assignment on Marine retention and 
performance.  
Conversely, the Army has recently rolled out its Army Talent Alignment Program 
(ATAP), which serves as a marketplace in which Army officers can list their desired duty 
assignments and match with commands that are looking for specific traits and capabilities 
in their officers. According to Major General Joseph Calloway, commander of the U.S. 
Army Human Resources Command, in its first year, ATAP ensured that  
more than 55% of officers receiv[ed] their first-choice assignment and more 
than 80% of the officers receiv[ed] an assignment from their top 10% of 
preferenced jobs. Of those numbers, 47% of assignments had one-to-one 
matches, meaning the officer and the unit made one another their top 
preference. (Kimmens, 2020)  
Though it will be a few years before the effects that ATAP has had on the Army’s 
retention of high-performing officers can be measured, the results of this year’s slating 
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process indicate that it is possible to meet mission requirements while taking into account 
the preferences of individual officers and commands.  
 In the military, numerous policies limit the monetary incentives the DoD can use 
to retain its top talent which necessitates thorough research and evaluation of alternative 
incentives for its high performers. As such, it is crucial that the Marine Corps examine all 
possible non-monetary talent management tools at its disposal. Using civilian studies and 
analysis of the talent management systems of other service branches as a foundation, I build 
a thorough research study that examines the effect of obtaining desired duty assignments 
on the retention and performance of Marines. 
 As General Berger outlines in the CPG 2019, “the essence of all manpower systems 
is to encourage those you need and want to stay…our current system lacks the authorities 
and tools to accomplish that simple outcome in anything but a blunt way” (USMC, 2019a, 
p. 7). In order to thrive in future amphibious operations, the Marine Corps must join the 
21st century in terms of talent management, retention, and specialization. 
A. PURPOSE 
Currently, the Marine Corps has no incentive-based model for retention of top 
performers and lacks the duty assignment systems used by other services to optimize both 
servicemember and command utility. I believe that creating a system or marketplace 
capable of matching Marines to their desired duty assignment will aid in both their 
retention and performance. It is vitally important, however, to use econometric analysis to 
ensure that using personnel preference matching will, in fact, deliver those desired effects. 
The purpose of this research is to assess the impact that obtaining desired duty assignments 
has on the performance and retention of Marine Corps personnel to determine whether duty 
assignment can be used as an incentive-based tool for talent management within the Marine 
Corps. 
B. SCOPE AND METHODOLOGY 
Two research questions frame this study: (1) What are the direct performance 
effects of Marines obtaining a desired duty assignment compared to Marines who obtain 
3 
an undesired duty assignment? and (2) What are the direct retention effects of Marines 
obtaining a desired duty assignment compared to Marines who obtain an undesired duty 
assignment? My hypothesis is that Marines who obtain desired duty assignments 
outperform and outlast Marines who receive orders that do not align with their preferences.  
For this study, I use demographic, performance, and duty station preference data 
for active-duty Marines from 2013 to 2020 from the Marine Corps’ Total Force Data 
Warehouse (TFDW) to conduct a time-fixed fixed effects difference-in-differences 
analysis that compares the performance trends of Marines who obtained a desired duty 
station early in their career to those who did not. For the measure of performance, I chose 
the fitness report (FITREP) relative value at processing (RELVALPROC) because it 
measures performance at a moment in time while controlling for differences in reporting 
senior (RS) evaluation tendencies. A more in-depth discussion of this decision can be found 
in Chapter IV. I compare these values both before and after duty station assignment for 
three groups: (1) Marines who were assigned a desired duty station; (2) Marines who were 
not assigned a desired duty station; and (3) Marines who indicated no duty assignment 
preference. To compare the retention of Marines who obtained a desired duty station 
relative to those who did not, I use survival analysis to determine whether there was a 
statistically significant difference in the two groups’ average years of service. I use years 
of service as the metric of retention because this variable measures the total time a Marine 
spends in the Marine Corps. 
On each FITREP, Marines record their top three duty station preferences. This data 
poses a unique opportunity for analysis because these inputs are not considered during the 
personnel assignment process (Gonnella, 2020). This means that assignment to a desired 
duty station as declared on a FITREP is truly random. The method of input for these 
preferences also enables me to compare performance and retention rates between different 
categories of Marines who obtained a desired duty station. Marines can choose between 
listing the specific monitored command code (MCC) of the unit they want to be assigned 
to or selecting from pre-populated categories such as “recruiting duty” or “security forces-
Atlantic,” for example. Please see the Appendix for a full list of these pre-populated 
options. This allows for comparison not only of the performance and retention of Marines 
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who obtained their preference to those who did not, but also the performance and retention 
of Marines with different sets of duty assignment priorities. 
C. RESULTS AND FINDINGS 
As hypothesized, assignment to a desired duty station does have a statistically 
significant impact on the future performance of Marines. When Marines are assigned to 
desired duty stations early in their careers, they perform on average 0.213 points higher on 
their FITREPs relative to Marines who were not assigned to desired duty stations. Top-tier 
performers who received orders to a preferred duty station performed 0.336 points better 
than other top-tier performers who did not obtain desired duty stations. Marines who 
requested and were assigned to the operating forces particularly outperformed peers who 
requested but were not assigned to the operating forces by 0.537. There is also statistically 
significant correlation between assignment to a desired duty station and total years of 
service. Results indicate that officers and top performers particularly outlast their 
counterparts when they are assigned to a preferred duty station early in their careers. 
Additional results can be found in Chapter V. As a result of this research, my primary 
recommendation is that the Marine Corps refine its processes for soliciting, storing, and 
synthesizing Marines’ duty station preferences. Doing so will better arm Marine Corps 
policymakers with the information and tools necessary to employ preferential duty 
assignment as an incentive for continued service and performance in the future.  
D. ORGANIZATION OF CHAPTERS 
In Chapter II, I discuss the anticipated changes to the future state of warfare that 
substantiate the need for ratification of talent management processes, describe the process 
for listing duty station preferences on FITREPs, and outline the current assignment policies 
for both officers and enlisted personnel in the Marine Corps. In Chapter III, I discuss the 
findings of a significant body of research into non-monetary incentives, duty assignment 
preferences and matching, and their implications on my own research. In Chapter IV, I 
describe the data and methodologies behind my research, and in Chapter V I break down 
the results of my research as well as its limitations. In Chapter VI, I outline my 
5 
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II. BACKGROUND 
The amphibious warfare of the future will be characterized by accelerated 
technological advancement, additive manufacturing, and increased reliance on unmanned/
autonomous vehicles and weapons systems. Though advancements in technology may 
result in a reduction of the number of Marines needed across the force, they will, somewhat 
paradoxically, also facilitate an increase in the quality of Marines required to carry out the 
mission. This changing character of warfare will facilitate increased investment in retaining 
well-trained Marines with specialized skillsets to employ these rapidly advancing systems. 
By implementing non-monetary incentive models to retain the nation’s most talented 
Marines, the Marine Corps can best posture itself for success in 21st-century amphibious 
warfare. 
 As the character of amphibious warfare has changed throughout its history, the 
Marine Corps has often focused its efforts on innovating systems and force design to react 
to these changes while relying on the steadfast, reliable, and resilient nature of Marines to 
employ them. However, advanced equipment in the absence of trained personnel to employ 
that equipment is useless. It is time the Marine Corps treats its most expensive and 
irreplaceable resource—people—as a capability worth innovating and investing in. If the 
Marine Corps wants to remain the expeditionary force in readiness for amphibious 
operations, it must be prepared to modernize its manpower systems to align with the 
changing character of warfare. Specifically, the Marine Corps must think outside the box 
to create non-monetary incentives, such as preferential duty assignment for top performers, 
to improve retention of the Marine Corps’ most talented personnel.  
A. FITREP DUTY STATION PREFERENCES 
Per Marine Corps Order (MCO) 1610.7A, Performance Evaluation System, active-
duty Marines have the option to indicate up to three desired duty stations in Section 9 of 
their FITREP, as is illustrated in Figure 1, before submitting it to their RS for evaluation 
(USMC, 2018).  
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Figure 1. Duty Station Preferences on FITREP 
Marines can choose to type in the specific MCCs of the units they want to be assigned to, 
choose from a pre-populated menu of 49 pre-populated categories of preferences, submit 
no preferences, or select a combination of the three as is illustrated in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2. Duty Preferences with Pre-populated Y-Preferences 
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These preferences are captured and maintained by TFDW but are not used during 
the assignment process (Gonnella, 2020). The pre-populated categories illustrated in  
Figure 2 and listed in their entirety in the Appendix are not defined within MCO 1610.7, 
the FITREP itself, or in any other publication that I could find. Some categories listed in 
the auto-populated list, such as “Staff Duty Afloat (West),” are not common to the Marine 
Corps vernacular and are also not defined in any publication that I reviewed. Similarly, 
there is no associated list of MCCs that map to these pre-populated categories. 
B. GENERAL ASSIGNMENT POLICY 
The process of assigning Marines to duty stations and billets across the Marine 
Corps is delegated to the Deputy Commandant for Manpower and Reserve Affairs 
(M&RA) by the Commandant of the Marine Corps and is a function of manning and 
staffing. Per MCO 5320.12H, Precedence Levels for Manning and Staffing (2019), 
manning is defined as “how many billets the Marine Corps can afford to buy,” and staffing 
is defined as assignment of “available, chargeable inventory against billets bought” (p. 2). 
The Marine Corps rarely has enough Marines to fulfill all requirements, so it has 
established written guidance to facilitate proper staffing and manning. Because the 
inventory of personnel available rarely fulfills the requirements as outlined in the table of 
organization and equipment (TO&E), the Marine Corps assigns one of four unit 
precedence-level categories and associated minimum or “red-line” manning and staffing 
levels each year to each unit identified with a unit identification code (UIC). The following 
precedence level categories are listed in priority order: excepted command, operating 
forces command, priority command, and proportionate share command (USMC, 2019b, p. 
2). The “red-line” manning levels for each of these unit categories facilitates the 
assignment process for the monitors. 
C. OFFICER ASSIGNMENT PROCESS  
Officer duty assignments are handled by monitors who work at Manpower 
Management Officer Assignments (MMOA). Each monitor can expect to manage the 
career progression of up to 1,700 officers in a given specialty (Boada, 2019). Per MCO 
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1300.8, Marine Corps Personnel Assignment Policy (2014), the very first paragraph of the 
Officer Assignments chapter states: 
Monitors make officer assignments based on the following priorities (listed 
in order of precedence): a. Needs of the Marine Corps. b. Career Progression 
(Operating Forces, Supporting Establishment, Seniority). c. Overseas 
Control Date (OCD). d. Individual preference. e. Restricted officers 
(warrant officers and limited duty officers) must only be assigned to 
restricted officer billets within their respective MOSs. (USMC, 2014, p. 2-
1) 
Monitors are selected from the general population and serve in the billet for the standard 
36 months before returning to the fleet. These monitors conduct a “roadshow” once a year, 
where they visit every major Marine Corps base to meet with the officers who fall under 
their jurisdiction. This process is supposed to provide officers transparency and input into 
the assignment process but, as is noted in the MCO above, this is rarely the case.  
Officers who are due to rotate from their first duty assignment are often sent 
preference surveys, though—once again—the officers are screened and assigned based on 
the “needs of the Marine Corps” (USMC, 2014). These surveys are also not kept on file. 
One recommendation I would make is that these surveys be retained for further analysis 
into duty station preference matching. Once all manpower requirements are determined 
based on manning and staffing inputs, M&RA begins the screening process for command, 
special education programs, recruiting duty, resident professional military education, and 
other selective programs. Marines are screened and routinely selected for these programs 
whether they have interest in them or not. Assignment to most of these programs incurs a 
service obligation of at least three years and sometimes a “payback tour.” Turning down 
these orders can result in processing for separation from the Marine Corps. 
Once the results of these screening boards are announced via Marine administrative 
message (MARADMIN), monitors begin the process of slating all officers within their 
given occupational field and grade-range who are due to rotate. Orders are then issued to 
the officers and modified as required to meet new Marine Corps requirements. Figure 3 
graphically depicts this process. Though Marines input their duty station preferences into 
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each FITREP they submit, MMOA has confirmed that these preferences are not referenced 
for the purposes of assignment (Gonnella, 2020). 
 
Figure 3. MMOA Assignment Battle Rhythm. Source: MMOA FY20 
Roadshow PowerPoint. 
D. ENLISTED ASSIGNMENT PROCESS  
The enlisted assignment process is similar to that of the officer corps. Manpower 
Management Enlisted Assignments (MMEA) is in charge of assigning enlisted Marines to 
follow-on duty stations. MMEA monitors are enlisted personnel who fulfill the role of 
monitor for approximately 36 months before rotating back to the fleet, similar to their 
MMOA counterparts. Each monitor can expect to have between a few hundred and a few 
thousand Marines in their given occupational specialty and grade-range, known as the 
monitor’s “population.” Monitors will conduct “roadshows” to meet with Marines and 
gather information regarding their expected rotation date, eligibility, and preferences.  
A key component of the enlisted assignment process is special duty assignments 
(SDA). These are considered career-enhancing (and for many specialties, career-required) 
12 
assignments to recruiting, the drill field, and Marine security guard duty. Marines can 
submit packages to obtain an SDA but can also be selected by the SDA selection team and 
be required to submit a package to determine eligibility. Similar to the officers, assignments 
to SDAs and other specialty programs such as assistant Marine officer instructor and 
combat instructor require screening. Once these programs have been staffed and announced 
via MARADMIN, monitors begin slating their population of Marines for assignment based 
on the manning and staffing precedence levels.  
E. DISCUSSION 
There has been a great deal of discussion in the Marine Corps and in the literature 
I reviewed surrounding automating the personnel assignment process. Many believe it can 
save the Marine Corps time and money while optimizing the utility of individual Marines. 
The proposals range from the use of a single-commodity network flow optimization 
program that weights Marine Corps requirements and personnel preferences, to the creation 
of a marketplace in which Marines can interact with commands directly, similar to the 
ATAP system recently implemented by the Army. Though my research does not directly 
evaluate any of the proposed assignment systems, my analysis contributes to the general 
body of research surrounding the feasibility and viability of preferential duty assignment 
as a non-monetary incentive. In the following chapter, I discuss the existing body of 
research surrounding non-monetary incentives and preference matching, and how they 
relate to the Marine Corps assignment process. 
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III. LITERATURE REVIEW 
The literature reviewed for this thesis can be broken down into two major areas of 
study: (1) nonmonetary incentives and preferences and (2) duty assignment preferences 
and matching. Inherent in both categories of research related to talent management are the 
questions Is this effective? and Is this practical?, which can be more broadly defined as the 
associated benefits and costs, respectively, of a given talent management tool. My research, 
by utilizing standardized duty station preference data obtained through fitness reports, 
provides both broader and deeper analysis into the viability of utility-optimizing duty 
assignment tools and their projected effect on retention and performance. These studies 
provide insight into possible outcomes of my study, inform my decisions regarding the 
processes and procedures used in data analysis, and bolster my hypothesis that Marines 
who obtain desired duty assignments outperform and outlast Marines who do not. 
A. NON-MONETARY INCENTIVES AND PREFERENCES 
In the civilian realm, studies devoted to the impact of non-monetary incentives 
(NMIs) on employee satisfaction, performance, and retention are limited compared to 
studies related to monetary compensation. However, there is an expanding body of 
literature that suggests that nonmonetary factors, such as job assignment and satisfaction, 
are important to employee productivity, and these studies provide insight into potential 
incentives for the Marine Corps. The bulk of the DOD-related research into investment in 
human capital, however, centers around NMIs—such as duty station preferences—due to 
the numerous rules and regulations governing the way the DOD can promote and 
compensate its service members. My research builds upon this body of literature by 
analyzing the effect that increased control over job assignment in the Marine Corps has on 
the productivity and longevity of Marines’ careers. 
Ichniowski et al.’s (1997) study of steel line workers at 26 plants finds that certain 
NMIs (referred to in the study as human resource management practices)—such as flexible 
job assignment, employment security, and job training—led to increased employee 
productivity when compared to more narrow and traditional job descriptions and strict 
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hourly wage models. This study aims to contribute empirical evidence to the growing body 
of qualitative research surrounding the effects of NMIs on employee productivity. The 
study designs a fixed effects model using a panel data set of 2,190 monthly observations 
of the productivity of steel line finishers at plants with varying levels of NMIs to determine 
whether certain NMIs or combinations of incentives lead to greater quality and quantity of 
steel outputs compared to those plants that do not use NMIs. The results indicate that steel 
production plants that use the “very cooperative and innovative” NMIs experience seven 
percentage points more steel production than those that use the “least cooperative and 
innovative” NMIs (Ichniowski et al., 1997). The study also provides a cost-benefit analysis 
that illustrates that steel plants that invest in the most progressive combination of NMIs 
can see as much as a $1.17 million increase in operating profits. Though this study 
evaluates the effectiveness of over 15 NMIs, both individually and in combination, and 
provides a detailed cost-benefit analysis, it is limited in scope and by the number of 
observations available. The authors also focus on broadly applied incentives and not on 
how those incentives interact with employee preferences. My research includes a sample-
size of over 27,000 observations of Marines’ performance and retention while taking into 
account the role employee preference plays in the effectiveness of NMIs. 
Another study by Stitt (2009) expands upon a growing body of research into the 
military’s use of NMIs to facilitate talent management by assessing the costs associated 
with NMIs as opposed to merely the rewards. Stitt’s thesis uses a linear programming 
assignment optimization model to assign 45 Sailors to 60 billets with 50% weight on both 
Navy preferences and Sailor preferences to answer the research question, “What is the cost 
of those non-monetary incentives that restrict sailor assignments in the Navy’s Sailor 
detailing process?” (Stitt, 2009). Stitt runs 81 sequences of assignment that consider 
different weights of Sailors’ homeport, billet, platform, and geographic stability 
preferences as well as the U.S. Navy’s permanent change of station (PCS), training, and fit 
costs to acquiesce to those preferences. The results indicate that as 50% more weight is 
placed upon a Sailor’s preferences in assignment, the cost associated with that assignment 
increases by about 30%. While this research contributes significantly to the “cost” side of 
a cost-benefit analysis of preference-based assignment tools in the Navy, it does not 
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consider the effect that NMIs have on performance or retention. My research helps to 
illustrate the “benefit” side of duty station-related NMIs to further inform policymakers as 
to the viability and applicability of a preference-based duty station assignment tool 
specifically within the Marine Corps. 
V. L. Butler and V. A. Molina (2002) examine the research question, “What are the 
top Sailor preferences influencing the enlisted distribution process in the Aviation Support 
Equipment Technician (AS) community?”  Butler and Molina use research into the Navy’s 
current Manpower, Personnel, and Training Systems; discussions, interviews; and surveys 
to conduct a first-time qualitative analysis of the current distribution of enlisted Sailors 
within the AS community as well as the viability of a future two-sided matching 
assignment process. Their results indicate that while the U.S. Navy’s current AS 
assignment process assumes that Sailor preferences are based strictly upon type of duty, 
type of billet, and duty location, most AS Sailors’ preferences are affected primarily by 
“civilian spouse employment opportunities, co-location with spouse/family 
accompaniment” opportunities, affordable cost of living, and home ownership viability 
(Butler & Molina, 2002).  The authors conclude that the U.S. Navy should place more 
emphasis on Sailor preferences during the distribution process, recommend that the U.S. 
Navy automate the enlisted duty preference process, and include many of the factors listed 
above in the Enlisted Duty Preference Form. While this study conducts a thorough 
qualitative analysis of Sailor and command assignment preferences and input, it does not 
include the quantitative analysis necessary to address possible outcomes of superior 
preference matching on talent management, retention, or mission readiness. By using 
econometric models to examine the effects that a servicemember’s assignment has on 
performance and career longevity, my research can provide policymakers the data 
necessary to determine whether investment in superior duty station preference-matching 
technologies is worthwhile for the Marine Corps. To effectively gauge returns to 
investment in preference-matching, however, it is important to ensure that all other 
variables are held constant. To do that, it is necessary to conduct within-group analysis to 
control for differences in preferences.  
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In a 2002 study, S. B. Dale and A. B. Krueger estimate the financial return to 
individuals who attended elite private colleges compared to those who attended public 
universities. Instead of merely considering which institutions students attended and their 
subsequent earnings, Dale and Krueger (2002) also examine the colleges to which students 
applied and the colleges to which the students were accepted to. In doing so, they control 
for the preferences and type of person each applicant is. They examine the difference in 
earnings not only between private and public-school graduates, but also between graduates 
who applied to and were admitted by the same types of universities. This within-group 
analysis enables me to similarly analyze the difference-in-differences of returns to duty 
station preference matching between groups of Marines with similar preferences. For 
example, I can compare the outcomes for Marines who prefer to be assigned based on 
location separately from Marines who specifically want to serve in the operating forces. In 
doing so, I am able to control for the category of preferences that a Marine has—a 
previously intangible and thus immeasurable variable. Adapting Dale and Krueger’s 
within-group difference-in-difference models enables me to control more accurately for 
Marines with similar preferences and their unobservable traits, thus more precisely 
estimating the actual performance and retention returns to preference-matching. 
B. DUTY ASSIGNMENT AND MATCHING 
The literature related to duty assignment and matching in the DoD includes a 
healthy balance of empirically based research into optimization and market-based 
approaches as well as qualitative assessments of attitudes and proposed improvements 
surrounding the current assignment and matching processes. While there is research that 
suggests that the use of algorithms to better match servicemembers’ preferences with 
command needs is viable, and research that indicates servicemembers’ may experience 
increased utility if they could play a greater role in the duty assignment process, I found no 
research that examines the actual empirical effect that obtaining desired duty assignments 
has on retention and performance of personnel. My research builds upon this incomplete 
body of literature by analyzing the effect that increased control over job assignment in the 
Marine Corps could have on the productivity and longevity of Marines’ careers. 
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Alger’s (2019) thesis investigates the current Marine Corps officer assignment 
system and uses an optimization model to analyze the viability of an automated officer 
assignment process that matches officers’ preferences with command requirements. Unlike 
other research into Marine Corps duty station assignment, Alger uses a single-commodity 
network flow problem that equally weights both officer duty station preferences and billet 
requirements to minimize costs while meeting mission requirements, similar to the Army’s 
recent ATAP endeavor. By creating a Ground Officer Assignment Tool (GOAT), Alger 
was able to match 1,666 Marines to 1,666 billets while achieving a 75% success rate in 
assigning officers to one of their top two billets, and an 86% success rate in assigning 
officers to their top geographic preference. While Alger was able to successfully 
demonstrate that an optimization of duty assignment model could improve officer utility, 
it is limited in scope. While officer utility is important, officers make up only about 11% 
of Marine Corps personnel. This study also did not examine the effect that optimizing 
officer utility has on subsequent productivity and talent retention. My research can help 
determine whether a tool similar to the GOAT is a worthwhile investment for the Marine 
Corps by analyzing the effect that being assigned to a preferred duty station has on officer 
and enlisted Marines’ productivity and retention.  
A qualitative study conducted by M. Ramirez and D. H. Park in 2003 examines 
enlisted Marines’ satisfaction with the duty and billet assignment process through the 
distribution of surveys and personal interviews. Their study aims to address the following 
research questions:  
• What are the perceptions from the Marine Corps Operating Forces 
regarding the current assignment process?  
• Does the Marine Corps need new tools to improve the assignment 
process?  
• What new tools can be introduced to make the process more efficient? 
(Ramirez & Park, 2003) 
The authors find that 36% of the 95 Marines surveyed stated that they were not satisfied 
with the assignment process, and 72% of those stated the primary reason for their 
discontent was the lack of duty station/billet choices. Of the 95 Marines surveyed, 44% 
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had only one or two assignment options available to them when speaking to their monitor 
about follow-on orders.  
In interviews, many Marines voice frustration with how difficult it was to obtain 
information about open assignments and the timing of those assignments. Similarly, 
Marines expressed that when they spoke to monitors, they felt as though their monitors’ 
primary objective was to fill vacancies quickly, instead of matching Marines’ preferences 
with the demands of the operating forces (Ramirez & Park, 2003). Of the Marines 
surveyed, 33% state that their monitors were “not very receptive to resolving conflict 
between [their] personal desires and the needs of the Marine Corps,” and 44% of 
respondents stated that their monitors do not treat all Marines fairly in the assignment 
process (Ramirez & Park, 2003). Though not asked specifically if the ability to choose their 
next assignment would increase the likelihood that they stay in, “90% of the survey group 
agreed that if they could choose their next assignment using the Internet, it would increase 
their satisfaction with the process.” When asked, “If you have decided to leave, what had 
the greatest influence on your decision?,” approximately 25% of respondents answered 
“assignment” (Ramirez & Park, 2003). The authors also compare the Marine Corps’ 
enlisted assignment process with that of the Navy, which provided a good foil for the 
Marine Corps’ process. Many Sailors are “not only satisfied with their desired duty 
preference, but receive satisfaction from the process itself,” and it appears that Marines 
value the same considerations and want to feel like a valued commodity within the Marine 
Corps (Ramirez & Park, 2003).  
This study provides a great deal of insight into the frustrations and ideals of enlisted 
Marines as well as qualitative evaluations of current and proposed assignment systems. 
However, the authors were limited to 95 qualitative observations, all of whom were 
stationed in California. Also, many of the assignment processes that were on the rise in 
2003 are either no longer applicable or have been optimized and improved since this study. 
My quantitative research bridges the gap between how Marines feel about the assignment 
process and what actually happens to their performance and retention when their 
preferences are filled.  
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V. L. Butler and V. A. Molina’s (2002) thesis also aims to address the research 
questions, “What are the top command preferences influencing the enlisted distribution 
process in the AS community?” and “How are command and Sailor preferences currently 
accounted for in the enlisted distribution process?” The authors find that of the 100 surveys 
distributed to commands, “85% of the respondents state that they do have input in the 
distribution process” and 95% report that they communicate directly to the detailer but that, 
conversely, Sailors’ input into the distribution process is minimal (Butler & Molina, 2002). 
Specifically, the authors conclude that “there is a need for an improved enlisted distribution 
process that incorporates Sailor and command preferences” and that “Sailors dissatisfied 
with the detailing process are less likely to reenlist” (Butler & Molina, 2002). They 
recommend that the U.S. Navy restructure the detailing processes to improve retention and 
mission readiness. While this study conducts a thorough qualitative analysis of Sailor and 
command assignment preferences and input, it does not include the quantitative analysis 
necessary to address possible outcomes of superior preference matching on talent 
management, retention, or mission readiness. By using econometric models to examine the 
effects of servicemembers’ obtaining a desired duty assignment on performance and career 
longevity, my research can provide policymakers the empirical analysis necessary to 
determine whether investment in market-based and preference-matching tools is a 
worthwhile investment for the Marine Corps.  
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IV. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
A. DATA DESCRIPTION 
1. Data Sources 
The data for this study come from three sources: Total Force Data Warehouse 
(TFDW), MMRP-30, and M&RA. The TFDW data spans January 2013 to March 2020 and 
includes data related to an individual Marine’s unit MCC, unit orders assignment date, 
armed forces qualification test (AFQT) and general classification test (GCT) scores, 
ethnicity, race, gender, and total years of service for all active-duty Marines. MMRP-30 
provides FITREP data for each report written on an active-duty Marine between January 
2013 and March 2020 as well as the list of 49 prepopulated duty assignment categories 
available on FITREPs (see Appendix). This FITREP data provides snapshots by FITREP 
dates related to performance and duty station preferences, rank, time in grade (TIG), 
primary military occupational specialty (PMOS), physical fitness test (PFT) and combat 
fitness test (CFT) scores, and date of rank for each FITREP written on a Marine. Finally, 
M&RA provides a comprehensive list of MCCs of every unit in the Marine Corps. I use 
this list to determine whether the duty station MCC Marines were assigned to matches the 
preferences they indicated on their most recent FITREP prior to assignment. 
2. Data Cleaning and Merging 
To begin, I merge the TFDW data outlined above to the MMRP-30 FITREP data 
by each Marine’s electronic data interchange personal identifier (EDIPI), resulting in 
2,292,742 reports for 997,412 Marines between 2013 and 2020. On each FITREP, Marines 
have the option to declare up to three preferred duty stations. However, these data fields 
can be populated by actual MCC codes or more general categories such as “recruiting duty” 
or “post or station-west coast.” Meanwhile, the data on orders received indicates the 
specific MCC code and date a Marine is assigned to that unit. 
To determine whether a Marine was assigned a desired duty station (I refer to this 
group of Marines as “preferred” from here on in) or was not assigned to a desired duty 
station (henceforth referred to as the “control” group), I first hand-map of the list of 2,967 
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MCCs provided by M&RA to the 49 categories of duty station preferences as listed in the 
FITREP pre-populated module (see Appendix). This creates an MCC matrix that indicates 
which MCCs fall under each Y-category. For example, MCC code 19F, which represents 
3d Assault Amphibian Battalion (3d AABn), falls under three categories: Y02- FMF, Y04-
FMF-West Coast, and Y09-Post or Station West Coast. On the MCC matrix, there is a “1” 
listed under each of these categories and a “0” is listed under each category that 19F does 
not fall under. 
Using this MCC matrix, I map each of the three declared preferred duty stations on 
a Marine’s FITREP to every Y-category. Next, I match the MCC indicated in a Marine’s 
follow-on assignment orders to each of the Y-categories indicated in the MCC matrix. 
Combining this information enables me to determine whether a person’s Y-preference on 
the FITREP was met when assigned a specific MCC during the orders assignment process. 
Thus, when a Marine does not declare a specific MCC but a more general Y-category in 
their FITREP preferences, I can still indicate whether a Marine received orders that 
matched their preference.  
3. Final Sample 
I limit my analysis to the impact of assignment to a preferred station on Marines’ 
subsequent performance and retention early in their careers because I believe that Marines’ 
experiences in the Marine Corps after a few years on active-duty service will have a 
significant impact on their long-range view of the institution as a whole. After Marines 
have a tour or two, they have a better idea of what they really want to do with their Marine 
Corps career, no matter their total length of service. The subsequent assignments are 
formative ones that set the tone for the rest of their time in the Corps. These assignments 
create the lens through which Marines examine the utility of each additional expended unit 
of effort and each additional year of service.  
For these reasons, I limit my sample to the preferences of enlisted Marines who are 
sergeants with at least one year TIG, or, if no orders are assigned during their tenure as a 
sergeant, I use the duty station preferences they listed as staff sergeants. For Marine 
officers, I limit the sample to the duty station preferences of first lieutenants with at least 
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one year TIG or, if no orders are assigned during their tenure as a first lieutenant, I use the 
duty station preferences they listed as captains. For both groups, I specifically use the duty 
station preferences listed on the FITREP that was processed immediately before new orders 
were assigned. To do this, I match the “to date” of the FITREP just prior to the “orders 
assignment date” to determine the set of preferences to consider in my analysis. I create a 
binary variable titled “these preferences” to indicate which set of preferences should be 
used for matching. For a Marine to be considered in the preferred group, they must have 
been assigned to an MCC that matched one of their top three preferences as listed in the 
FITREP denoted by “these preferences.” To do this, I compare MCCs and/or Y-preferences 
indicated on the appropriate FITREP to the MCC of the unit a Marine was subsequently 
assigned to. I create a binary variable called “GotPref” and assign Marines a “1” if their 
preferences match their orders or a “0” if they do not. Marines who did not list preferences 
in the relevant FITREP are assigned a “NoPref” indicator variable to indicate missing 
preferences. Next, I outline the outcome variables I measure in this study to compare 
Marines who received their preferred assignments to the control group. 
4. Performance and Retention Outcome Variables 
I use the RELVALPROC of Marines’ FITREPs according to their individual RS as 
the performance outcome in this study. The RS is a Marine’s direct superior who evaluates 
a Marine on 14 characteristics on a scale of 0-5. Combined, these scores make up the 
average of the report (ATR). These scores are converted into a relative value on a scale of 
80-100 by comparing a Marine’s score to other Marines of the same rank who have been 
evaluated by the same RS. When considering performance metrics, I had to decide between 
three possible variables: ATR, RELVALPROC, and cumulative relative value 
(RELVALCUM). ATR is simply the raw score from 0-5 of the FITREP and does not take 
into account the evaluation trends of RSs. I chose RELVALPROC over ATR because it 
adjusts for how a Marine’s performance at a given moment in time compares to other 
Marines who were evaluated by the same RS. RELVALPROC controls for differences in 
standards between RSs such that a Marine who is evaluated by an RS who, on average, 
gives out lower scores is not penalized relative to a Marine who is evaluated by an RS who 
assigns inflated scores.  
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I chose RELVALPROC over a similar metric, RELVALCUM, because 
RELVALPROC is a better lens through which to observe performance trends over time. 
RELVALCUM is also measured on a scale from 80-100, but it changes over a Marine’s 
entire career as the RS continues to evaluate more Marines of the same rank. While this 
means that, over time, RELVALCUM can become the most accurate measure of a Marine’s 
performance at a given moment in their career relative to Marines of the same rank, it has 
significant drawbacks when it is observed over time. As each Marine is compared to a 
larger pool of Marines, the RELVALCUM of all Marines in that RS’s profile will trend 
toward the middle, or 90. This means that top performers’ scores will superficially appear 
to decline over time, while bottom performers’ scores appear to improve simply due to the 
fact that all reports in the given profile are trending toward the average. This distortion 
adversely impacts analysis of performance trends over time. I chose RELVALPROC as the 
optimal measure of performance because I believe it is the most accurate and fair measure 
of performance as it changes over time. These scores are also easily compared between 
officers and enlisted because all Marines from the rank of sergeant through lieutenant 
colonel are evaluated using the same RELVALPROC scale.  
To effectively compare performance both before and after assignment, I define the 
timeframe “AfterOrders” as the time from a Marine’s arrival at their new duty station 
through up to three years after a Marine’s “orders assignment date.” The RELVALPROC 
values from this AfterOrders time are compared to the “BeforeOrders” period, which is 
comprised of the RELVALPROC of all FITREPS received within the three-year period 
prior to the “orders assignment date.” This time frame is generated to best compare a 
Marine’s average performance immediately before assignment and immediately after 
arrival at the new unit, based on whether that Marine was assigned to a preferred duty 
station or not.  
I use years of service (YOS) as the retention outcome for this study because it 
measures the total tenure in the Marine Corps of the individuals in my study as of August 
19, 2020 when the data was pulled. Other metrics, such as an indicator variable to 
determine retention at five or ten years were considered. I determined that, while right-
censored, total YOS was a more inclusive and accurate depiction of retention due to the 
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fact that Marines have differing contract lengths both during the period that their 
preferences were made and during the subsequent assignment of orders. This affects the 
amount of time a Marine is required by law to remain in the Marine Corps. YOS more 
accurately conveys the total time a Marine chooses to stay in the Marine Corps and is an 
effective lens through which to conduct survival analysis to account for the censoring of 
this variable. 
5. Summary Statistics 
Table 1 reports the summary statistics of the Marines included in my final analytical 
sample. My final sample is made up of 27,860 Marines who were sergeants, staff sergeants, 
first lieutenants, or captains between January 2013 to March 2020 who received follow-on 
duty assignments within this timeframe. I break down the summary statistics for the 
Marines included in my analysis into the three sample groups listed previously. The 
preferred group includes 12,836 Marines, the control group includes 11,642 Marines, and 
the no preference group includes 3,382 Marines. For the baseline performance and 
demographics for all three groups, I used the PMOS category, enlisted/officer status, and 
RELVALPROC as annotated on the FITREP of Marines just prior to assignment. Due to 
an inability to obtain panel data that perfectly aligned with the FITREP data, I use the 
AFQT, GCT, gender and race/ethnicity indicators as listed at the time the data was 
obtained, August 19, 2020, with the assumption that in the vast majority of cases, these 
variables will not have changed over time.  
The descriptive statistics indicate that all three groups are relatively similar, though 
preferred Marines are more likely to be in aviation or combat arms MOSs than the control 
group. These two communities have stricter career paths, so Marines may be indicating on 
their FITREPs preferences for assignments to which they are more likely to be assigned, 
regardless. I recommend conducting further analysis of the effects of duty station 
assignment on outcome variables by MOS to better examine this correlation. Preferred 
Marines are also more likely to be white, male, and officers. Compared to preferred 
Marines, no preference Marines are more likely to be female and enlisted, and to have 
higher AFQT scores. I examine some of these phenomena in the results section. 
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AFQT 55.751 55.322 0.787* 55.751 60.838 -5.079*** 
 (28.299) (28.561) (2.328) (28.299) (25.394) (-9.436) 
GCT 111.870 111.821 0.019 111.870 112.118 -0.253 
 (17.380) (16.511) (0.095) (17.380) (15.427) (-0.768) 
Black (0/1) 0.105 0.124 0.018*** 0.105 0.118 -0.013* 
 (0.306) (0.329) (4.622) (0.306) (0.323) (-2.098) 
White (0/1) 0.644 0.613 -0.028*** 0.644 0.622 0.020* 
 (0.479) (0.487) (-4.840) (0.479) (0.485) (2.193) 
Hispanic (0/1) 0.170 0.170 0.002 0.170 0.178 -0.007 
 (0.376) (0.376) (0.352) (0.376) (0.383) (-1.001) 
Asian (0/1) 0.025 0.030 0.004* 0.025 0.024 0.001 
 (0.157) (0.172) (2.006) (0.157) (0.154) (0.226) 
Female (0/1) 0.054 0.070 0.016*** 0.054 0.071 -0.017*** 
 (0.226) (0.255) (5.488) (0.226) (0.257) (-3.677) 
CSS MOS (0/1) 0.365 0.403 0.030*** 0.365 0.364 -0.001 
 (0.481) (0.491) (5.122) (0.481) (0.481) (-0.058) 
Cmbt MOS (0/1) 0.255 0.228 -0.023*** 0.255 0.244 0.011 
 (0.436) (0.420) (-4.545) (0.436) (0.430) (1.268) 
Avn. MOS (0/1) 0.283 0.229 -0.047*** 0.283 0.267 0.018* 
 (0.450) (0.420) (-8.874) (0.450) (0.443) (2.118) 
Enlisted 0.767 0.758 0.016** 0.767 0.870 -0.102*** 
 (0.423) (0.428) (3.106) (0.423) (0.337) (-12.922) 
RELVALPROC 93.150 93.212 -0.004 93.150 92.896 0.257* 
 (4.990) (5.133) (-0.067) (4.990) (5.158) (2.388) 
Observations 12,836 11,642 27,860 12,836 3,382 16,218 
Note: This table summarizes demographics for preferred, control, and no preference Marines in the sample 
from January 2013 to March 2020. Standard deviations are listed in parentheses. Columns (1) and (2) display 
the mean coefficients for the preferred and control groups, respectively, and Column (3) displays the difference 
in coefficients between the treated (Preferred) and control (NoPref) groups. Below the coefficient differences 
in Column (3) are their associated T-statistics in parentheses. Columns (4) and (5) display the mean coefficients 
for the Preferred and NoPref groups, respectively, and Column (6) displays the difference in coefficients 
between these two groups. Below the coefficient differences in Column (6) are their associated T-statistics in 
parentheses. Statistical significance shown by *p < 0.05, **p < 0.01, ***p < 0.001. Data source: USMC Total 




1. Random Assignment 
As with most empirical research, the best possible conditions under which to 
evaluate the causal impacts that duty station assignment has on the determined outcome 
variables is through a randomized control trial (RCT). An RCT ensures that any observed 
effects of a treatment on outcome variables are purely the result of the treatment, as 
opposed to other variables that could have an impact. RCTs do this through random 
assignment, which controls for the effect that any other factors could have upon the results.  
One of the reasons that the duty station preferences that Marines list on their 
FITREPs provide such a rare opportunity for analysis is that they have no impact on where 
a Marine is actually assigned. As mentioned previously, the preferences listed on FITREPs 
are not considered at all during the duty assignment process (Gonnella, 2020). Because 
Marines are assigned to duty stations regardless of the preferences they list on their 
FITREP, any assignment of a Marine to a desired duty station can be assumed to be 
random, though the Scope and Limitations section below provides exceptions and 
clarifications. Thus, any observed impact to these preferred Marines’ performance and/or 
retention can be assumed to be reasonably uninfluenced by other factors. This effectively 
random assignment of Marines to duty stations enables me not only to view the impacts of 
desired duty assignment on outcome variables, but also to conduct within-group difference-
in-differences analysis between the types of preferences that Marines have. 
2. Duty Station Preference Categories 
After examining their distribution, I choose to consolidate all possible preferences 
into five categories based on applicability and the frequency of selection. Those five 
categories are as follows:  
• Fleet Marine Force (FMF): consolidates preferences for assignment to 
the operating forces overseas, in the continental United States (CONUS), 
Hawaii, on the West Coast, and on the East Coast. Includes Y01–Y05 on 
the FITREP preference prepopulated menu (see Appendix). 
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• Geographic (GEO): consolidates preferences for assignment based on 
location to any post or station overseas, CONUS, Hawaii, West Coast, or 
East Coast. Includes Y08–Y10 on the FITREP preference prepopulated 
menu (see Appendix). 
• Other: consolidates preferences for assignment to security forces, 
command duty afloat, staff duty afloat, various school assignments, 
Inspector & Instructor (I-I) duty, recruiting, and joint staff tours. Includes 
Y11–Y79 on the FITREP preference prepopulated menu (see Appendix). 
• No preference (No Pref): includes Y00 on the FITREP preference 
prepopulated menu and duty station preferences that are left blank (see 
Appendix). 
• MCC: consolidates preferences for any specific unit based on an MCC 
entry as opposed to a categorical or Y-preference. Includes all 
typographical entries that do not directly match the three-character Y-
preferences as indicated in the Appendix. 
These categories enable me to explore the types of preferences that Marines have and the 
frequency in which they are obtained. More important, however, these categories allow me 
to examine the differences in outcome variables based on the category of preferences that 
Marines have. In this manner, I can analyze the difference in the causal estimate differences 
related to five “types” of Marines. This form of analysis is also known as difference-in-
differences of within-group returns. 
3. Models 
a. Fixed Effects  
My use of panel data enables me to control for time-invariant, unobservable 
heterogeneity using a fixed effects model. In essence, the fixed effects model holds 
constant all unobservable individual phenomena—motivation, risk-aversion, interpersonal 
skills, and so on—across every Marine in my sample. Doing so removes cross-sectional 
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variation and returns only the variation used to derive causal relationships. I also employ 
time-fixed effects to account for any varying attributes between different years. I conduct 
a Hausman test to determine whether a fixed effects or random effects model was most 
efficient for my dataset. The test returns a p-value for the test statistic (Chi-squared-stat) 
that was less than α = 0.05, so I reject the null hypothesis and employ a fixed effects model. 
Table 1 Columns 1-3 in Chapter V also illustrate the differences in the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and fixed effects models and demonstrate the superiority of the time-fixed 
fixed effects model. To further remove omitted variable bias related to both observable and 
unobservable independent variables, I implement a difference-in-differences model to 
control for the differences in Marines’ preference-types (PrefType). 
b. Difference-in-Differences 
To control for the differences between Marines of differing preference types, I 
examine the differences in outcome variables within similar groups of Marines based on 
the five preference categories outlined above. This approach allows me to control for 
differences in preference and how those differences may affect performance and retention 
regardless of whether or not a Marine is assigned to a desired duty station. By comparing 
results within these five specific groups, I ensure that I am not comparing the type of 
Marine who wants to go to school to the type of Marine who wants to be stationed in 
Hawaii, because these Marines likely have inherently different traits and motivations. To 
do this, I measure the outcome variables using the models expressed in Equations 1 and 2.  
The difference-in-differences approach outlined above is similar to the one used in 
Dale and Krueger’s (2002) analysis of economic returns to private versus public colleges. 
The authors conduct this analysis by employing difference-in-differences analysis within 
specific groups of students based on which schools students applied and were accepted to. 
Dale and Krueger compare the economic returns between private- and public-school 
graduates only within groups where graduates applied and were accepted to similar 
schools. Their approach ensures that outcome variables are not affected by underlying 
factors that would lead individuals to apply to public/private schools to begin with. 
Similarly, my model ensures that performance and retention are not impacted by the 
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underlying factors that would lead Marines to submit preferences based on geographic 
location as opposed to likelihood of deployment, for example. Put a different way, my use 
of a fixed effects difference-in-differences model produces causal outcomes not only by 
holding constant unobservable individual factors but also by ensuring there are no pre-
assignment outcome trends that differ by group.  
The relevant variables are defined as follows: 
• RELVALPROC: The average relative value of Marines’ FITREPs at the 
time the FITREP was processed on a scale of 80–100 
• Preferred: binary variable that indicates Marines who have/will obtain a 
desired duty station  
• NoPref: binary variable that indicates Marines who listed no duty 
assignment preference 
• AfterOrders: binary variable that indicates this is a FITREP observed 
after orders were received and arrival at new unit. One can interpret this 
coefficient as the average RELVALPROC of all FITREPS received within 
3 years after Marines are assigned new duty station orders, relative to the 
average RELVALPROC of all FITREPS received 3 years prior to 
assignment 
• PrefType: a set of categorical variables that indicate which of the five 
categories a Marine’s preference falls into 
In Equation 1, I estimate the fixed effects difference-in-differences of 
RELVALPROC between those who obtain a desired duty station and those who do not:  
RELVALPROCit = β0 + β1GotPref it + β2AfterOrders it + β3(GotPref ∗AfterOrders) it + 
β4NoPref it + β5(NoPref*AfterOrders) it + ai + τt + ε it (1) 
where each of the variables is as defined above for individual Marine i in time t. ai is a 
fixed effect to account for the unobserved, individual-specific factors that do not change 
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over time, τt is a time-fixed effect, and ε is the error term. The particular parameter of 
interest is β3, the average change in performance after receiving a preferred assignment 
compared to Marines who did not, which allows me to isolate the effects of obtaining a 
desired duty station on performance from other underlying variables. I use 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the individual level to account for 
similarities within individuals over time. To create more accurate causal analysis, I also 
estimate the within-group difference-in-differences of RELVALPROC separately for 
various groups (e.g., enlisted versus officer, performance tertiles, and duty station 
preference categories). 
c. Survival Analysis 
I conduct the survival analysis portion of my study using the following Cox 
Proportional Hazard Model in Equation 2 to compare the time to separation between the 
control, preferred, and NoPref groups. 
ℎ(𝑡𝑡|𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 ) = ℎ0(𝑡𝑡)exp(xj𝛽𝛽) (2) 
where h=hazard function, h0=baseline hazard, t=survival time measured in YOS, 𝑥𝑥𝑗𝑗 = 
covariates (Preferred, NoPref, and PrefType), 𝛽𝛽=coefficients of the covariates, and the 
“failure” variable is the binary variable “separated.” This model allows me to analyze the 
effect that obtaining a desired duty station has on a Marine’s rate of separation from the 
Marine Corps, known as the hazard, at a given point in time t.  
In both the fixed effects and survival analysis portions of my research, I conduct 
subgroup analysis to investigate the impact of duty assignment on performance and 
retention. The subgroup analysis compares outcome variables between officer and enlisted 
personnel, performance tertiles, and the five categories of preferences.  
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Preference Matching 
Though I designed this study to be as robust as I am capable of executing, there are 
some limitations both in terms of the scope and fidelity of results. Many of the limitations 
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are related to preference matching. One limitation is related to how the duty station 
preferences are entered into the FITREP. Though Marines can choose from the pre-selected 
Y-categories described in the Appendix, they can also hand input the MCC or even the Y-
category they desire. For this reason, I cannot ensure that individuals enter the accurate 
codes to indicate their preferences. I attempt to mitigate this transcription issue by 
including alpha-numeric variations for the Y-preferences. For example, I list “Y00,” 
“YOO,” “YO0,” “Y0O” and other variations to try to capture as many of the “no 
preference” Marines as possible. However, this fix is not feasible for the 2967 MCCs that 
Marines may have mis-entered. Thus, a Marine who enters “199F” instead of “19F” as 
their duty station preference will not be marked as preferred even if they are assigned to 
MCC:19F-3d AABn. That said, my results indicate that Marines who list specific MCCs 
as preferences have the highest rate of obtaining desired duty stations of all five categories, 
so any issues created by typographical errors appear to be minimal.  
Another limitation is that the pre-populated menu for specific duty station 
categories does not define which MCCs fall under each category. Because of this, a Marine 
could choose a pre-populated option that does not actually align with their desires. For 
example, Y13 is labeled “Command Duty Afloat (East),” and nowhere in MCO 1610.7 
(Performance Evaluation System [PES] manual) or any other order that I found does it 
define which MCCs fall under this category. For this reason, the assumptions I make in 
this study about which MCCs fall under specific Y-categories, like the assumptions of other 
Marines, may be incorrect, resulting in inaccurate preferred/control observations. Another 
concern is consistency of MCCs and unit location. MCCs may have changed, as M&RA 
posts an updated MCC list every year. Certain units may have moved or consolidated to 
different coasts, and different boundaries may be drawn annually to accommodate different 
recruiting requirements. For example, recruiting stations in South Dakota that were 
originally 8th Marine Corps District in one year may become a part of 9th Marine Corps 
district the next. This means that a Marine who entered Y44: “Recruiting Duty-8th District” 
and was assigned to a recruiting station in South Dakota may have originally received their 
preference but will be considered as not having received their preference in this study. 
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Though these inconsistencies are few and far between, they may negatively, though 
minimally, affect causal outcomes.  
2. Reliability of Preferences 
The scope of this research is primarily limited by an observed lack of duty station 
preferences among Marines, which limits the overall number of observations. Specifically, 
12% of Marines in my sample indicated no duty station preference on their FITREP. My 
assumption is that in most cases, this is more an indication that Marines are aware that the 
preferences listed on FITREPs are not considered during assignment than an indication that 
12% of the sample have no actual preference. I have had numerous conversations with 
Marines who were told by their RSs to forgo submitting preferences because they are not 
considered during the assignment process. Others were told that not listing preferences 
indicates to promotion boards that they are more selfless and willing to go wherever the 
Marine Corps sends them. For this same reason, Marines may submit inaccurate 
preferences to appease their RSs. A Marine may truthfully want to be go into recruiting, 
for example, but has been told by his RS that the best Marines prefer the FMF to any other 
assignment. In this situation, the Marine has no incentive to be honest about his preferences 
as they will not affect his assignment, but he does have an incentive to list what he knows 
his RS will respect in pursuit of a better evaluation. Similarly, I know a Marine officer who 
was advised that it was the “consistency of duty station preferences over time” that 
mattered to the Marine Corps, so she has maintained the same three duty station preferences 
throughout the past six years, despite the fact that her true preferences have changed (A. 
Sawyer, personal communication, December 8, 2018). This sentiment was echoed by a 
gunnery sergeant who has observed similar guidance throughout his 14 years of service in 
the Marine Corps (M. Cox, personal communication, March 6, 2021). All of these 
situations could lead to inaccurate causal outcomes due to the fact that my hypothesis is 
that Marines perform better and stay in longer if they are assigned to a duty station they 
genuinely prefer, not the duty station they felt compelled to list due to various external 
factors. 
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3. Scope of Preference 
The duty preferences listed on FITREPs are also only based on unit and do not 
capture other assignment-related preferences, such as the billet a Marine would like to fill 
at the desired duty station, or anticipation of deployment opportunities. If a Marine is 
assigned to the unit they desire but is placed in an undesired billet, the results may in fact 
understate the true returns to performance and retention of duty assignment. For example, 
if a Marine wants to go to 3d AABn to deploy as a company commander and is 
subsequently assigned to 3d AABn but as the assistant operations officer with no 
opportunity to deploy, this Marine would be placed in the preferred group for the sake of 
this study but is unlikely to exhibit the same performance and retention outcomes as other 
preferred Marines because their true preferences are not being met. Similarly, Y26 and Y27 
on the preference pre-populated menu indicate “overseas with dependents” and “overseas 
without dependents,” respectively. Unfortunately, I am unable to consider preferences like 
these within the confines of this study, though there may be merit in examining them further 
in future research. In Chapter VI, I discuss my recommendation for remedying more of 
these limitations and broadening the scope of future studies. 
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V. RESULTS 
A. GENERAL PREFERENCE, PERFORMANCE, AND RETENTION 
TRENDS 
1. Preference and Assignment Trends 
First, I explore the general trends in duty station preference categories overall. 
Figure 4 illustrates the total distribution of preferences based on the five categories I 
outlined above. 
 
Figure 4. First Preference Distribution for Total Population 
Of particular interest is the fact that 30% of Marines chose to look up and hand-
enter the specific MCC of their first-choice duty station. This is significant because it takes 
more time and effort to lookup the MCC for a specific unit, and many Marines, in my 
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experience, are never counseled on this process or how to obtain the MCC list. This 
category does, however, capture all preferences that do not fall into the Y-categories, so 
MCC-Type would also capture all typographical errors and/or “random inputs.”  
Nearly a third of the sample selected one of the five FMF-Type preferences from 
the pre-populated list. This could be indicative of a number of Marine Corps-specific 
trends, including a true or indoctrinated desire to return to “the fleet.” The career 
progression of most Marines is reliant upon serving in specific roles in the FMF/operating 
forces. Studies have shown that Marine officers who spend too much of their career away 
from the FMF in particular have lower rates of promotion, comparatively (Gonnella, 2020). 
The FMF-Type preferences are also the first five options that populate on the pre-populated 
menu after the “no preference” option, so their frequency of selection could also reflect 
tendency to take the path of least resistance when filling out an optional section of a 
FITREP.  
The FMF-Type preferences are immediately followed by the three Geographic-
Type preferences on the pre-populated list and then the 38 categories that make up the 
“other” category which notably include school, recruiting, and joint duty preferences. 
Similar to the analysis of the FMF-Type preferences, the relatively low rate of geographic 
and Other-Type preferences could reflect the emphasis the Marine Corps places on “fleet 
time” early in Marines’ careers and, inversely, the lack of emphasis placed on other kinds 
of assignments. Marines early in their careers are also assumedly more easily influenced 
by the messaging of the Marine Corps, the recommendations of their superiors, and the 
pressures to conform to the perceived “right career path.” I predict that an analysis of the 
distribution of these preference categories later in Marines’ careers might yield 
significantly different results.  
Only 12% of the population indicated no duty station preference, either by leaving 
Section 9 of the FITREP blank or by selecting “Y00” from the pre-populated duty station 
preference options. As I discuss in the Scope and Limitations subsection of Chapter IV, 
even though this is a relatively small proportion of the population, I still believe this number 
may be inflated and reflects the perceived “futility” of inputting preferences that are not 
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considered during the assignment process as opposed to an honest reflection of apathy as 
it relates to duty assignment.  
Figure 5 depicts the distribution of preference types between officer and enlisted 
personnel. As illustrated, fewer enlisted Marines indicated duty station preferences or 
Other-Type preferences than the officers. This may reflect on the specific circumstances 
related to the sample population I analyze. At the point in time that I examine Marines’ 
duty station preferences, first lieutenants will have submitted at least six FITREPs and may 
subsequently have a better understanding of how to fill out preferences than their sergeant 
counterparts. The sergeants I observe may have submitted a FITREP to their RS for the 
first time and may not be fully abreast of the process.  
 
Figure 5. Officer Versus Enlisted First Preference Distribution  
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Figures 6 illustrates the proportion of individuals who obtain a desired duty station, 
do not obtain a desired duty station, and have no preference—broken down by officer and 
enlisted status.  
 
Figure 6. Officer Versus Enlisted Assignment Distribution 
 Per Figure 6, rates of obtaining a desired duty station are greater than hypothesized. 
I cannot conclude from this data whether this is simply due to the fact that Marines’ 
preferences line up with the needs of the Marine Corps or whether there are active attempts 
by monitors to solicit and match Marines’ desires. I am aware that monitors often send out 
surveys to Marines that are due to PCS. The results in Figure 6 indicate that these surveys 
may be (a) reflecting the same preferences Marines list on their FITREPs and (b) taken into 
account by monitors during the assignment process. 
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Enlisted Marines have a higher rate of indicating no preference, which explains the 
lower rates of both obtaining a desired duty station preference and not obtaining a desired 
duty station preference. The fact that the rate of indifference toward duty station 
assignment in enlisted personnel is nearly double that of the officer corps raises questions 
about whether all Marine Corps personnel are being educated equally on different types of 
duty assignments. This difference may also indicate that enlisted Marines perceive greater 
futility in expressing their duty station preferences despite similar rates of assignment to 
preferred duty stations. In the following paragraphs, I examine the effects that obtaining a 
desired duty station has on future performance. 
2. General Impacts to Performance 
Figure 7 illustrates the general difference in performance outcomes between 
Marines who obtain a desired duty station, those that do not, and those with no preference 
over time.  
 
Figure 7. General Performance over Time 
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As illustrated, preferred individuals tend to perform just slightly below the control 
group prior to orders assignment and then perform better than the control following 
assignment. Just before assignment, the previously climbing scores begin to plateau. This 
is likely due to the fact that RSs have now evaluated more Marines, bringing the relative 
value at processing toward 90, or the average. All three groups see a drop in performance 
around the time they arrive to their new unit. This is likely the result of two common-place 
phenomena in the Marine Corps. First, promotion boards expect to see an improvement in 
Marines’ performance on each subsequent FITREP under each RS who evaluates them. 
Stagnation or decline in RELVALPROC under the same RS shows a promotion board that 
a Marine is not improving, and the likelihood of this Marine being selected for promotion 
is very slim, especially at higher ranks.  Because of this, some RSs evaluate new Marines 
in their profile superficially low so that they have “room to grow” in their profile to show 
improvement. Second, these Marines likely just left a unit where they worked for the same 
RS for a substantial amount of time. During this time, each FITREP likely improved upon 
the previous one. After arriving to a new unit, these Marines now work for a new RS who 
is just getting to know them, and that RS is comparing them to every other Marine of the 
same rank—individuals that they have likely known for a greater period of time. After that 
initial performance dip, Marines’ performance scores once again rebound and begin to 
climb. Marines with no preference do, however, appear to perform significantly worse after 
assignment compared to the control and preferred groups. Right before assignment, there 
is a slight decline in the performance of all Marines as well. This is likely due to RSs 
departing and their replacements demonstrating the evaluation strategies I outlined above. 
Figure 8 depicts how preferred enlisted Marines start out on relatively even footing 
as the control group but pull ahead after assignment and particularly outperform the 
Marines with no preference. Comparatively, the officer preferred group performs relatively 
on par with the control group both before and after assignment. Marine officers with no 
preference see a sharp negative departure from the control and preferred groups right before 
assignment, though not a statistically significant one, as is illustrated in Table 2.  This may 
indicate that the kind of commissioned Marines who do not take the time to input a 
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preference on a FITREP may also be the type of Marine to perform to the bare minimum 
standard in other tasks, and thus obtain lower scores relative to the other two groups.  
 
Figure 8. Performance Outcomes for Enlisted and Officers 
More formally, Table 2 depicts the results of the estimated difference-in-differences 
model described in Equation 1 of Chapter IV. The coefficient estimates in Table 1 are the 
average increase or decrease in RELVALPROC in the three years after assignment relative 
to the control group—those Marines who did not receive a desired duty station assignment. 
Column (1) illustrates the results of an OLS regression run without controls; Column (2) 
illustrates the results of an OLS regression that includes controls such as race, gender, and 
enlisted status; and Column (3) is the person and time-fixed fixed effects model that holds 
constant all observable and unobservable individual phenomena (such as motivation, risk-
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Table 2. General Difference-in-Differences in Performance by Assignment 
 OLS OLS+ FE Enlisted FE Officer FE 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
After Assignment -0.063 -0.035 -0.052 -0.167** 0.513*** 
 (0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.055) (0.113) 
GotPref After Assignment 0.149** 0.123* 0.213** 0.232** 0.141 
 (0.058) (0.057) (0.067) (0.074) (0.154) 
NoPref After Assignment -0.270** -0.274** -0.260* -0.223+ -0.233 
 (0.089) (0.089) (0.108) (0.117) (0.350) 
Observations 206318 206318 206318 164974 41344 
R2 0.000 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.003 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by EDIPI in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, 
*** p < 0.001. The outcome variable for all models is the difference-in-differences of the average 
RELVALPROC scores obtained 3 years after assignment. The coefficients represent relative changes to 
the baseline RELVALPROC that encompasses the average of the scores obtained 3 years before 
assignment. All coefficients are relative to the control group, which is represented by Marines who did 
not receive a desired duty station. Model (1) is an OLS model with no controls; Model (2) is an OLS 
model with controls to include gender, race, and enlisted status. Model (3) is the fixed effects model 
described in Equation 1 with time-fixed effects; Model (4) is the fixed effects model described in 
Equation 1 with time-fixed effects for enlisted Marines; and Model (5) is the fixed effects model 
described in Equation 1 with time-fixed effects for Marine officers. All five models include the variable 
“preferred_after_dontcare,” which encompasses Marines who did not input a first duty station preference 
but did enter a second and/or third and were subsequently assigned to one of those second two 
preferences. It is not illustrated as it does not stand to inform policy and presents conflicting information. 
Data source: USMC Total Force Data Warehouse. 
 
All of the first three models indicate a statistically significant increase in 
performance for those who got their preference, relative to those who did not. Models (1) 
and (2) are broadly similar, but there is a fairly large increase in the coefficient for those 
who got their preference from Model (2) to Model (3). This highlights the importance of 
the fixed effects model: there are differences in who gets their preference and who does 
not, and these differences are above and beyond what is captured by observable 
characteristics such as AFQT scores and gender. Thus, the best model compares how 
people change relative to their own prior scores. Column (3) depicts a statistically 
significant increase of 0.213 in RELVALPROC after assignment for all preferred Marines 
relative to the control. Columns (4) and (5) separate the analysis by enlisted and officers. 
Column (4) indicates a 0.232 post-assignment increase specifically for preferred enlisted 
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Marines relative to the control. Officers overall appear to score 0.515 better on 
RELVALPROC after assignment, regardless of whether they received a preferred duty 
station, though the preferred group return no statistically significant changes above and 
beyond that experiences by the control officers. 
There is a statistically significant 0.260 decline in performance for the overall 
NoPref population and a 0.223 decline at the 10% level for NoPref enlisted Marines 
specifically after assignment, relative to the control. The NoPref drop is the exact same 
coefficient for the officers as it is for the enlisted, but it cannot statistically be differentiated 
from zero given the larger standard errors on the smaller sample of officers. These results 
indicate that there is a statistically significant increase in performance relative to the control 
for Marines who obtain a desired duty station, specifically for enlisted Marines. Though 
these results are statistically significant, they are only marginally practically significant. 
Though an increase of 0.2 in RELVALPROC is unlikely to change a Marine’s overall 
ranking in an RS’s profile, there is no way to quantify these returns in terms of a Marine’s 
actual output and contribution to the Marine Corps. My hypothesis is that we would see far 
more practically significant results if Marines believed their preferences played a role in 
their assignment. In the following section, I examine the general retention trends related to 
duty assignment. 
3. General Retention Trends 
Figure 9 illustrates the general retention trends of enlisted and officer personnel as 
survival curves. Figure 9 depicts that enlisted Marines have a higher survival rate than 
officers until approximately 15 years of service, at which point enlisted personnel separate 
at a far greater rate than officers for the next five years. As indicated in Table 2, there 
appears to be only a minimal positive difference in years of service between those who 
obtain a desired duty station and those who do not. With these curves, drops in survival 
rates can also be seen at the end of each year as well as a sharp decline at the 20-year mark, 
which makes sense due to the fact that Marines can retire with benefits after 20 years of 
service. These results indicate only a marginal correlation between obtaining a desired duty 
station and length of service in the Marine Corps. I recommend further research to control 
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for observable variation within the preferred and control groups as well as specific analysis 
of retention after assignment, such as at the five- and ten-year marks. In the following 
section, I examine preference, assignment, performance, and assignment trends by 
performance tertile.  
 
Figure 9. Officer Versus Enlisted Survival Curves 
Table 3 reports the general retention trends as hazard ratios based on the Cox 
Proportional Hazard model for survival analysis as described in Equation 2. This model 
enabled me to analyze how assignment to a desired duty station influenced Marines’ rate 
of separation, known as the hazard, at a given point in time. This model suggests there is a 
correlation between obtaining a desired duty station and years of service, specifically for 
the officer corps. The hazard ratio depicted in Column (1) is statistically significant at the 
5% level and indicates that Marines who obtain a desired duty station preference may have 
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a 4.3% lower hazard of separating from the Marine Corps compared to the control. Officers 
have a 12.3% lower hazard of separation that is significant at the 1% level.  
Table 3. General Hazard Separation Ratios  
 Total Enlisted Officer 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Preferred 0.957** 0.981 0.877*** 
 (0.013) (0.014) (0.033) 
Observations 27860 21616 6244 
    
Notes: Robust standard are errors in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. For all Cox 
Proportional Hazard models in this table, the “failure” variable is the binary variable “separated,” the duration 
variable is years of service, and the outputs represent the hazard ratio for separation from the Marine Corps. 
Hazard ratios are all relative to the control and can be interpreted as follows: Hazard ratio = 1: No effect on 
the hazard of separation; hazard ratio < 1: decrease in the hazard of separation; hazard ratio > 1: increase in 
the hazard of separation. Model (1) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model for all preferred Marines; Model 
(2) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model for preferred enlisted; and Model (3) is the Cox Proportional Hazard 
model for preferred officers. There are no controls applied to these models; no conclusions of causation 
should be drawn based on correlation in between assignment and years of service. Data source: USMC Total 
Force Data Warehouse. 
 
In the following section, I analyze the preference, assignment, performance, and 
retention trends by performance tertile to determine whether there are significantly 
different impacts based on Marines’ prior RELVALPROC scores. 
B. PREFERENCES, PERFORMANCE, AND RETENTION BY TERTILE 
1. Preference and Assignment Trends by Tertile 
In this section, I examine the varying preferences, assignment trends, performance 
impacts, and retention effects of three categories of pre-assignment performers. I divide 
Marines into tertiles that reflect Marines in the bottom, middle, and top thirds of 
RELVALPROC before assignment to determine if preferential duty assignment impacts 
one performance group more than the others. As depicted in Figures 10 and 11, preferences 
are relatively similar across the tertiles and thus mirror the overall results examined in 
Figures 4 and 5. The top third is most likely to hand-enter the specific MCC code for their 
preferred duty station whereas the bottom third is more likely to select an FMF-Type 
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preference. This may be due to the fact that the FMF-Type preferences, as previously 
mentioned, are the first preference categories listed on the pre-populated menu after the 
“no preference” option and are, thus, the second-most path of least resistance. In the next 
section, however, I describe how future performance is impacted by assignment to a desired 
duty station relative to baseline performance. 
 
Figure 10. First Preference Distribution by Tertile  
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Figure 11. Assignment Distribution by Tertile 
2. Impacts to Performance by Tertile 
Figure 12 captures changes in performance by tertile over time. There is a 
significant decline of middle-third Marines with no preference relative to the control as 
well as a relative improvement in performance of preferred Marines in the top third in the 
three years following assignment.  
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Figure 12. Performance Outcome by Tertile 
Table 4 illustrates the difference-in-differences in performance after assignment by 
tertile numerically. There is no statistically significant impact to the bottom or middle third 
preferred Marines, but it can be observed in Column (3) that preferred top performers 
perform 0.336 better than their control counterparts post-assignment. This stands out in 
particular because top third Marines, in general, tend to perform 7.129 worse after 
assignment compared to before. These findings imply that using duty station assignment 
as an NMI to target top-tier Marines may be an effective tool for improving performance 
post-assignment. Column (1) indicates that bottom-third Marines, in general, tend to 
perform 3.075 higher after assignment, which may be due to these relatively “low 
performers” having an opportunity for a fresh start with a new RS. Conversely, middle-
third Marines overall have a statistically significant 2.77 decline in performance in the three 
years after assignment. 
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Table 4. Difference-in-Differences in Performance by Tertile 
 Bottom Third Middle Third Top Third 
 (1) (2) (3) 
After Assignment 3.075*** -2.077*** -7.129*** 
 (0.116) (0.104) (0.109) 
    
GotPref After Assignment -0.011 0.148 0.336** 
 (0.118) (0.107) (0.114) 
    
NoPref After Assignment -0.250 -0.503** 0.081 
 (0.195) (0.174) (0.179) 
Observations 62462 65106 62027 
R2 0.048 0.021 0.148 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by EDIPI in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. The outcome variable for all models is the difference-in-differences of the average RELVALPROC 
scores obtained 3 years after assignment. The coefficients represent relative changes to the baseline 
RELVALPROC that encompass the average of the scores obtained 3 years before assignment. All 
coefficients are relative to the control group which is represented by Marines who did not receive a desired 
duty station. Model (1) is the fixed effects model described in Equation 1 with time-fixed effects for the 
bottom third of performers; Model (2) is the fixed effects model described in Equation 1 with time-fixed 
effects for the middle third of performers; Model (3) is the fixed effects model described in Equation 1 with 
time-fixed effects for the top third of performers. All three models include the variable 
“preferred_after_dontcare” which encompasses Marines who did not input a first duty station preference but 
did enter a second and/or third and were subsequently assigned to one of those second two preferences. It is 
not illustrated as it does not stand to inform policy and presents conflicting information. Data source: USMC 
Total Force Data Warehouse. 
 
Though an increase of 0.3 in RELVALPROC is relatively small on a scale from 
80-100, these results indicate that top-performing Marines have a far more positive 
response to obtaining a desired duty station than their average and low performing 
counterparts. This may suggest that the Marine Corps may be able to take a more targeted 
approach to duty station assignment as a means of talent management than its Army 
counterparts did with its officer-wide ATAP rollout. Instead of trying to match all officers 
or all Marines with their top choice, the more economical choice may be for the Marine 
Corps to use duty station preference matching as an NMI for only the top-performing 
Marines. In the following section, I examine how duty station assignment is correlated with 
retention at the tertile level.  
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3. Impacts to Retention by Tertile 
Figure 13 illustrates the correlation between assignment to a desired duty station 
and survival rates between the top and bottom performers. The difference between these 
two tiers widens as years of service approach the 20-year retirement cut off. This makes 
sense, as top performers are likely to be retained at higher rates especially as the density of 
personnel at each subsequent rank declines. Assignment to a preferred duty station 
negatively impacts the performance of bottom-tier Marines whereas it positively impacts 
the performance of preferred top-tier Marines in the three years following assignment. 
Thus, bottom-tier preferred Marines’ performance either stagnates or declines, whereas 
top-tier Marines are more likely to improve, which makes top-tier preferred Marines 
relatively more eligible for promotion and thus retention. 
 
Figure 13. Top Versus Bottom Tertile Survival Curves 
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Table 5 illustrates retention outcomes as separation hazard ratios for preferred 
Marines by tertile relative to the control. We see in Columns (2) and (4) that the statistically 
significant results occur within the top and bottom thirds. Preferred bottom third Marines 
have a 5.5% lower hazard of separating and preferred top third Marines have a 9% lower 
hazard of separating relative to the control group. The correlation between years of service 
and preferred top-tier Marines indicates that further research into causal effects related to 
duty assignment and retention may be warranted. Similar to the performance results, it 
appears that top performers may be more responsive to obtaining a desired duty station 
than the middle and bottom performers. The survival rates are also depicted in  
Figure 13. 
Table 5. Hazard Separation Ratios by Tertile 
 Total Bottom Third Middle Third Top Third 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Preferred 0.957** 0.945* 0.962 0.910*** 
 (0.013) (0.022) (0.023) (0.023) 
Observations 27860 8183 8291 8182 
     
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. For all 
Cox Proportional Hazard models in this table, the “failure” variable is the binary variable “separated,” the 
duration variable is years of service, and the outputs represent the hazard ratio for separation from the 
Marine Corps. Hazard ratios are all relative to the control and can be interpreted as follows: Hazard ratio = 
1: No effect on the hazard of separation; hazard ratio < 1: decrease in the hazard of separation; hazard ratio 
> 1: increase in the hazard of separation . Model (1) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model for all preferred 
Marines; Model (2) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model for preferred bottom third performers; Model (3) 
is the Cox Proportional Hazard model for preferred middle third performers; and Model (4) is the Cox 
Proportional Hazard model for preferred top third Marines. There are no controls applied to these models; 
no conclusions of causation should be drawn based on correlation in between assignment and years of 
service. Data source: USMC Total Force Data Warehouse. 
 
Next, I examine the assignment, performance, and retention trends of preferred 
Marines by their categorical preferences in the following section. 
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C.  PERFORMANCE AND RETENTION BY PREFERENCE CATEGORY 
1. Assignment Trends by Preference Category 
To assess the differences in assignment, performance, and retention trends among 
Marines with different categories of duty station preferences, I began with the 49 pre-
populated Y-categories listed in the Appendix. I grouped these 49 preferences into nine 
more manageable and related categories: FMF, Geographic, Security Forces, Command/
Staff Duty Afloat, School, I-I duty, Recruiting/OSO, Joint Staff, and No Preference. I then 
created another category that includes all entries that were not pre-populated or blank and 
grouped them into an “MCC” category. After looking at the frequencies of selection for 
each category, I decided to condense the categories even further into the final five 
categories: FMF, Geographic, Other, No Preference, and MCC. Figure 14 shows the 
frequency with which Marines of each type of preference receive their first-choice duty 
station.  
 
Figure 14. First Preference Distribution by Preference Category 
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Despite the far broader net that the Y-categories cast, Marines with specific MCC 
preferences are assigned their first-choice duty station at far greater rates than their 
counterparts, despite there being only three geographic locations to choose from (i.e., East 
Coast, West Coast, or overseas). For example, only 40.2% of Marines are assigned to their 
first-choice if that choice is based on geographic location compared to the 67.3% of 
Marines who are assigned to the exact MCC they list in Section 9 of their FITREP. This 
may indicate that the Marine, the Marine’s staff non-commissioned officer in charge, or 
the Marine’s RS is working directly with other entities such as the monitor or representative 
from the desired unit to facilitate follow-on orders to specific units. Another possible 
explanation is that Marines are entering the MCC of units they have already unofficially or 
“verbally” been assigned to. A Marine officer I interviewed who entered the vetting process 
for assignment to Marine Forces Special Operations Command (MARSOC) was instructed 
by her interviewer to list MARSOC as her first-choice duty station on her next FITREP 
after being told her assignment to MARSOC was “all but pending” (A. Sawyer, personal 
communication, June 5, 2020). These types of external forces, though infrequent, may 
explain the significant share of Marines with MCC-Type preferences who receive a desired 
duty station. It makes sense that the Other-Type preference has the lowest rate of 
preferences matched due to the fact that many of the assignments listed in this section 
require additional vetting prior to assessment, such as through the SDA and commandant’s 
career-level education board screening processes. In the following section, I analyze the 
effects of duty assignment on performance by preference type.  
2. Impacts to Performance by Preference Category 
Figure 15 illustrates the difference-in-differences of performance trends between 
preferred and control Marines with FMF-Type preferences, as these subgroups display the 
greatest statistical and magnitudinous differentiation in performance. Preferred Marines 
with FMF-Type preferences perform about on par with the control FMF-Type Marines 
beginning approximately 1.5 years prior to assignment but then slowly exhibit greater and 
greater relative performance in the three years following. This depiction of FMF-Type 
performance trends over time align with the findings displayed in Table 6. 
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Figure 15. FMF-Type Performance Outcome 
Table 6 summarizes the fixed effects difference-in-differences of performance 
between Marines with different categories of preferences. Table 6 illustrates that the 
RELVALPROC of preferred Marines with FMF-Type preferences perform 0.537 better 
relative to Marines who do not obtain a desired duty station in the three years after 
assignment. This finding is statistically significant at the 1%  level as is the 1.893 average 
drop in performance of Marines with FMF-Type preferences in general after assignment 
relative to before. Preferred Marines with Other-Type preferences perform 0.277 worse 
than the control group after assignment at the 10% significance level. As mentioned in 
previous sections, there is statistical significance in the overall drop in performance of 
Marines in the immediate three years after assignment presumably due to developing new 
relationships with RSs and often artificially low initial scores. 
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Table 6. Difference-in-Differences by Preference Category 
 FMF GEO Other MCC 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
After Assignment -1.893*** -1.661*** -2.401*** -2.238*** 
 (0.117) (0.228) (0.152) (0.129) 
     
GotPref After Assignment 0.537*** 0.095 -0.277+ 0.144 
 (0.111) (0.228) (0.155) (0.116) 
     
Observations 66,294 16,276 35,292 65,008 
R2 0.015 0.012 0.018 0.017 
Notes: Robust standard errors are clustered by EDIPI in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p 
< 0.001. The outcome variable for all models is the within-group difference-in-differences of the average 
RELVALPROC scores obtained 3 years after assignment. The coefficients represent relative changes to the 
baseline RELVALPROC that encompasses the average of the scores obtained 3 years before assignment. All 
coefficients are relative to the control group which is represented by Marines who did not receive a desired 
duty station. Model (1) is the within-group fixed effects model described in Equation 1 with time-fixed effects 
for Marines with an FMF-Type preference category; Model (2) is the within-group fixed effects model 
described in Equation 1 with time-fixed effects for Marines with a GEO-Type preference category; Model 
(3) is the within-group fixed effects model described in Equation 1 with time-fixed effects for Marines with 
an Other-Type preference category; and Model (4) is the within-group fixed effects model described in 
Equation 1 with time-fixed effects for Marines with an MCC-Type preference category. All four models 
include a variable “preferred_after_dontcare” which encompasses Marines who did not input a first duty 
station preference but did enter a second and/or third and were assigned to one of those preferences. It is not 
illustrated as it does not stand to inform policy and presents conflicting information. The “NoPref After 
Assignment” was removed from this model due to the fact that those with “NoPref” would not have indicated 
one of the four preference categories mentioned above. Data source: USMC Total Force Data Warehouse. 
 
Despite an over representation in the preferred category, Marines with MCC-Type 
preferences do not perform in a statistically significantly different manner than the control. 
This phenomenon may be related to the unreliable nature of MCC preferences, or possibly 
due to lack of fulfillment of expectations. A Marine in any category of preference may 
discover that a new duty station, even if it is a duty station that matches their stated 
preferences, does not bring them the level of fulfillment or motivation to succeed that they 
expected. This disillusionment may be particularly prominent among MCC-Type Marines 
who are not simply choosing assignment to a broad location or non-deploying unit but are 
in fact interested in a specific unit for likely very specific reasons. If MCC-Type Marines 
have a strong enough preference for a unit to go through the steps to look up the MCC, 
they may be setting their expectations for that unit too high. This could result in particularly 
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acute disappointment if the unit does not meet those expectations. These are simply 
theories but theories that might be more directly addressed with further research. Finally, I 
examine the correlation between duty assignment, preference category, and retention in the 
following section. 
3. Impacts to Retention by Preference Category 
Table 7 illustrates retention outcomes as separation hazard ratios for preferred 
Marines by the five different preference types. It indicates that there is no statistically 
significant difference in the hazard of separation from the Marine Corps between the 
preferred and control groups based on my model. It does appear that Marines with MCC 
and GEO-Type preferences may have higher rates of separation, relative to the control, 
though not statistically significant ones. Though further analysis utilizing a different model 
may return slightly different results, these findings suggest that controlling for the 
differences between the type of Marine who wants to stay in the operating forces and the 
type of Marine who prefers one duty station location to another may not be significant 
enough to impact the years of service each spends in the Marine Corps. 
Table 7. Hazard Separation Ratios by Preference Category 
 Total FMF GEO Other MCC 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Preferred 0.957** 0.985 1.040 0.954 1.037 
 (0.013) (0.023) (0.050) (0.033) (0.027) 
Observations 27860 8986 2195 4888 8409 
      
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. + p < 0.10, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. For 
all Cox Proportional Hazard models in this table, the “failure” variable is the binary variable 
“separated,” the duration variable is years of service, and the outputs represent the hazard ratio for 
separation from the Marine Corps. Hazard ratios are all relative to the control and can be interpreted 
as follows: Hazard ratio = 1: No effect on the hazard of separation; hazard ratio < 1: decrease in the 
hazard of separation; hazard ratio > 1: increase in the hazard of separation. Model (1) is the Cox 
Proportional Hazard model for all preferred Marines; Model (2) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model 
for preferred Marines with FMF-Type preferences; Model (3) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model 
for preferred Marines with GEO-Type preferences; Model (4) is the Cox Proportional Hazard model 
for preferred Marines with Other-Type preferences; and Model (5) is the Cox Proportional Hazard 
model for preferred Marines with MCC-Type preferences. There are no controls applied to these 
models; no conclusions of causation should be drawn based on correlation in between assignment and 




Incentive-based models are only effective when they elicit desired behavior from a 
given population. All too often, organizations offer uniform incentives to large groups of 
individuals with vastly differing needs and motivations. Speaking about the Marine Corps’ 
talent management system, General Berger states, “currently, we target people via a mass 
fires approach, instead of more selective targeting” (USMC, 2019a). Blanket talent 
management strategies can waste resources on the wrong individuals, causing these 
methods to be both ineffective and costly.  
My use of within-group analysis presents a clearer picture of which Marines might 
respond most positively to the use of preferential duty assignment as an incentive. In 
summary, my key statistical findings are outlined below: 
• Enlisted Marines who are assigned to desired duty stations outperform 
their counterparts.  
• The top third of Marines who are assigned to desired duty stations 
outperform their top-performing counterparts. 
• Marines who prefer to serve in the FMF and are subsequently assigned to 
operational units outperform Marines with similar desires who are 
assigned elsewhere. 
• Officers who receive desired duty assignments remain in the Marine Corps 
longer relative to those who do not. 
• Top performers assigned to preferred duty stations serve in the Marine 
Corps longer than their peers. 
As the results indicate, the three subgroups whose performance is most impacted by 
assignment to a preferred duty station are enlisted Marines, top-third performers, and those 
Marines with FMF-Type preferences. Improved retention is most highly correlated with 
top performers and officers. Consequently, these groups also represent the key 
demographics the Marine Corps is most interested in retaining. If the Marine Corps truly 
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wants to “use money like a focused weapon, and aim it at the exact individual we need” 
then the Marine Corps has found its target (USMC, 2019a, p. 7). 
In the final chapter, I propose options for further research, outline my 




VI. FURTHER RESEARCH, RECOMMENDATIONS, 
CONCLUSION 
A. FURTHER RESEARCH 
As with most research, I am only able to conduct and capture a fraction of the 
analysis I am interested in within the confines of a single study. I believe there is a 
significant body of research into preference matching, performance, and retention in the 
Marine Corps that is waiting to be unpacked and examined. Below, I highlight my primary 
recommendations for expanding subgroup analysis of my findings, examining these same 
research questions through different lenses, and pursuing further related but differentiated 
research. 
I recommend further sub-group analysis into my findings by PMOS, gender, 
dependent-status, rank, race, and ethnicity. Research into whether there are statistically 
significant differences in outcomes for Marines who obtained a first versus second versus 
third duty station preference could also contribute notably to this area of study. I also 
recommend grouping specific MCCs into other relevant categories such as likelihood of 
deployment, staffing precedence levels per MCO 5320.12H, and the four elements of the 
Marine Air-Ground Task Force. Due to the topical nature of talent management, follow-on 
research could expand the body of data to span 2000-2020 but could focus on only the top 
10% or 20% of Marines to more closely examine the policy implications of utilizing duty 
assignment as an incentive for top performers.  
There are certainly other relevant metrics for measuring performance and retention 
in the Marine Corps. Instead of conducting survival analysis utilizing YOS, for example, 
follow-on researchers should consider using separation rates at 5 and 10 years of service. I 
specifically recommend a more robust survival analysis be conducted that controls for 
observable variation between observations. Other metrics of performance to consider are 
rate of promotion, rate of disciplinary action, RELVALCUM, or ATR. These post-
assignment measures of performance can also encompass five or ten years of FITREPs 
versus the three that I included. I recommend that further research be conducted into who 
is most frequently obtaining desired duty station preferences by PMOS, rank, gender, 
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ethnicity, and race and, inversely, which MCCs are most frequently being matched with 
Marines who prefer them.  
I also recommend that further research be conducted into the feasibility of an 
automated duty-preference matching system, similar to the GOAT model designed by 
Alger (2019), or the viability of more market-based approaches such as that of the Army’s 
recently employed ATAP system. The MMOA and MMEA also send out annual preference 
surveys to Marines who are due to PCS to determine their preferences. When I inquired 
about obtaining access to these surveys, I was informed that they are not retained. These 
surveys could provide more accurate depictions of the effects of obtaining a desired duty 
station than the FITREP duty station preferences do, because Marines know that their 
monitor is likely to actually consider the preferences listed on the survey when assigning 
orders, though this may in turn negatively impact random assignment. These MMEA/
MMOA surveys also pose an opportunity to solicit more qualitative feedback from Marines 
related to duty station preferences and assignment, such as whether or not they view 
choosing their follow-on duty station as an effective incentive. 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Primary Recommendation 
Based on the related literature, my analysis, and my key findings, my primary 
recommendation is that the Marine Corps begin collecting, retaining, and utilizing 
Marines’ duty station preferences as it evaluates and refines its talent management and duty 
assignment processes. Though there is more research to be conducted, I believe that there 
is evidence to suggest that preferential assignment can be used to incentivize top-tier 
Marines to stay in and perform in the Marine Corps. To facilitate further analysis, I 
recommend that preference data be solicited and maintained separately from FITREPs to 
ensure the fidelity of responses. MMEA and MMOA monitors already collect assignment 
preference surveys from Marines who are due to move, and I recommend that these surveys 
be equitably distributed, standardized, maintained, and synthesized for further analysis. I 
believe that this is the best course of action if the Marine Corps is serious about talent 
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management. My recommendations to address interim or short-term shortfalls in terms of 
duty assignment preference collection can be found in the following sections.  
2. Update FITREP Guidance and Form 
The guidance related to Section 9, Duty Station Preferences, of a USMC FITREP 
is limited to six bullet points in the PES manual, two of which apply only to reservists. 
These bullet points leave a great deal of room for interpretation and subsequent errors in 
both perceived intent and data entry (USMC, 2018). I recommend that the Marine Corps 
publish clarifying guidance in the PES manual that specifies exactly how to fill out Section 
9 so as to prevent errors in transcription. I also believe that the Marine Online module that 
is used for filling out FITREPs should be updated such that Marines may not enter a second 
or third duty station preference if they do not enter a first, as this is not an infrequent 
occurrence that creates interesting conundrums for promotion boards and analysts alike. I 
recommend that the Marine Corps publish an annual MARADMIN that defines each pre-
populated Y-category and outlines which MCCs fall under each of these Y-categories. I 
also recommend that the Marine Corps routinely update these Y-categories to come into 
compliance with commonly accepted vernacular and relevant clusters of preferences. For 
example, Y13 “Command Duty Afloat (East)” is not a term that I or any of my peers that 
I polled are familiar with, nor is it a term defined by any Marine Corps publication I could 
find. I do believe, however, that there should be a Y-category for a Marine Expeditionary 
Unit command category and that that category should be defined either in the pre-populated 
menu or in a separate publication.  These steps will alleviate a great deal of confusion 
surrounding the process for entering duty station preferences and improve the efficacy of 
the outputted data. However, these steps alone do not address the underlying issues related 
to the accuracy of duty station preferences on FITREPs. 
3. Track and Maintain Marines’ Preferences 
Long term, I do not believe that the FITREP is the proper vehicle for collecting and 
applying duty station preferences. However, until the collection process is updated, I 
recommend that the Marine Corps clarify in the PES manual and via MARADMIN why it 
is collecting duty station preferences via FITREPs and how these preferences will be used. 
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As discussed previously, the duty preference section of the FITREP is optional and 
widely—as well as accurately—believed to be unrelated to the duty assignment process. 
Because these preferences are not considered for assignment but are being examined during 
an evaluation process, Marines have a stronger incentive to fill out Section 9 in accordance 
with the perceived preferences of their evaluators as opposed to their own desires. This 
hinders not only the fidelity of the preference data, but also the impetus to submit duty 
preferences at all. As such, I recommend that the Marine Corps clearly communicates the 
intent behind any collection of duty station related data and conducts, via independent 
survey, further research into the feasibility and likely reception of preference matching. 
C. CONCLUSION 
The results outlined in Chapter V indicate that duty assignment plays a role in the 
performance and retention of Marines. Preferential duty assignment may also prove to be 
a less costly incentive model for inspiring the Marines the nation needs to not only stay but 
continue to perform. Marine Corps policy makers should pay particular attention to the 
effect that preferred duty station assignment has on the performance of enlisted Marines, 
top-performers, and the Marines who want to serve in the operating forces. These are the 
Marines we need and want to fight our nation’s wars, and the results indicate that 
preferential duty assignment has a particularly positive impact on their performance. 
Assignment to desired duty stations is also highly correlated with the retention of officers 
and top performers—the leaders that the nation needs to be making the difficult decisions 
both on the ground and at the strategic level. In the 2019 CPG, the Commandant states that 
“an incentives-based model would offer the ability to target incentives to specific 
individuals the Service wants to retain” (USMC, 2019a, p. 7). The results of this research 
indicate that preferential duty station assignment has potential to do just that.  
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APPENDIX: FITREP PRE-POPULATED DUTY STATION 
PREFERENCES 
Y00 No Preference / As Directed 
 Y01 FMF Overseas 
 Y02 FMF Conus 
 Y03 FMF Hawaii 
 Y04 FMF West Coast 
 Y05 FMF East Coast 
 Y08 Post or Station East Coast 
 Y09 Post or Station West Coast 
 Y10 Post or Station Overseas 
 Y11 Security Forces - Atlantic 
 Y12 Security Forces - Pacific 
 Y13 Command Duty Afloat(East) 
 Y14 Command Duty Afloat(West) 
 Y15 Staff Duty Afloat(East) 
 Y16 Staff Duty Afloat(West) 
 Y21 Appropriate Level School 
 Y22 Top Level School 
 Y23 Intermediate Level School 
 Y24 Career Level School 
 Y26 Overseas with Dependents 
 Y27 Overseas without Dependents 
 Y33 I-I Duty 
 Y34 I-I Duty - 1st District 
 Y35 I-I Duty - 4th District 
 Y36 I-I Duty - 6th District 
 Y37 I-I Duty - 8th District 
 Y38 I-I Duty - 9th District 
 Y39 I-I Duty - 12th District 
 Y40 Recruiting Duty 
 Y41 Recruiting Duty - 1st District 
 Y42 Recruiting Duty - 4th District 
 Y43 Recruiting Duty - 6th District 
 Y44 Recruiting Duty - 8th District 
 Y45 Recruiting Duty - 9th District 
 Y46 Recruiting Duty - 12th District 
 Y47 OSO Duty 
 Y48 OSO Duty - 1st District 
 Y49 OSO Duty - 4th District 
 Y50 OSO Duty - 6th District 
 Y51 OSO Duty - 8th District 
 Y52 OSO Duty - 9th District 
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 Y53 OSO Duty - 12th District 
 Y75 Joint Staff 
 Y76 Joint Staff - CONUS 
 Y77 Joint Staff - Overseas 
 Y78 Joint Staff - Asia 
 Y79 Joint Staff - Europe 
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